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The Use of Fiscal Policy in EMU: 
First Appraisal and Future Prospects
El Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento (PEC) en la UEM compromete a los gobiernos a alcanzar 
una situación próxima al equilibrio o al superávit presupuestario a medio plazo. Hasta el momento, 
el marco fiscal ha contribuido satisfactoriamente a la sostenibilidad financiera pública en la UEM y 
puede haber contribuido a la estabilidad financiera y a un bajo nivel de inflación medio. Sin embar-
go, estudios empíricos también sostienen que el PEC puede haber entrañado un sesgo procíclico 
de la evolución de la política fiscal, esto es, que los gobiernos hayan amortiguado el papel de los 
estabilizadores automáticos para respetar los límites establecidos del déficit. El PEC se encuentra 
en el punto de mira de las críticas y se han propuesto numerosas reformas. 
EDBko Egonkortasunerako eta Hazkunderako Itunak (EHI) gobernuak engaiatzen ditu epe ertainean 
aurrekontu-orekaren edo -superabitaren hurbileko egoera lor dezaten. Orain arte, zerga-esparruak la-
guntza egokia eman du EDBko finantza publikoen iraunkortasunerako, eta baliteke finantza-egonkor-
tasuna eta batez besteko inflazio-maila baxua lortzen ere lagundu izana. Dena dela, zenbait azterketa 
enpirikok esaten du balitekeela EHIk joera proziklikoa ekarri izana zerga-politikan, hau da, gobernuek 
egonkortzaile automatikoen zeregina leundu izana ezarritako defizit-mugak errespetatzeko. EHIa kri-
tiken jomugan dago, eta hainbat erreforma proposatu dira.
The Stability and Growth Pact in EMU commits governments to reach a close to balance or in surplus 
budget position in the medium term. Up to now, this fiscal rule has successfully contributed to 
ensuring public fi nance sustainability in EMU and may have been helpful to provide financial stability 
and a low level of inflation rates on average. Nevertheless, em pirical studies have also documented 
that the Pact could have lead to a pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy evolution: In order to respect the 
deficit ceilings, governments may have cushioned the role of automatic stabilis ers. The Stability Pact 
is under pressure and many proposals for reforms have been made.
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1. INTRODUCTION1
The use of ﬁ scal policy is one of the less 
consensual question among economists. 
Few years ago, Robert M. Solow (2004) 
and Robert E. Lucas (2003) expressed 
absolute opposite views on this topic in 
addresses they delivered at the International 
Economic Association Congress and at the 
American Economic As sociation Congress, 
respectively. Actually, both Nobel Price 
winners agreed on the followings:
1. As far as “resource allocation” and 
“income repartition” are concerned, 
public spending and taxation can be 
useful and welfare improving.
2. The third traditional rationale for 
public intervention in the economy, 
“macroeconomic stabilisation”, had 
successfully reached its objective in 
the US postwar-period.
* Correspondance: 7, Place Hoche - CS 86 514 - 
35065 RENNES CEDEX FRANCE, E-mail: sebastien-
pommierSuniv-rennesl. fr
3. If stabilisation policy is regarded as a 
discretionary management of aggregate 
demand, it must be ineffective and 
possibly harmful, due to political reasons 
and delays of implementation.
In Lucas’view, such stabilisation policies 
are no longer desirable. The main reason is 
that the remarkable stability in Postwar US 
income and con sumption can not be further 
more increased -and if it could, negligible 
welfare gains could be reached. In line with 
the theory of Real Business Cycle, Lucas 
argues that (i) most of economic disturbances 
come from productivity shocks -against 
which shifts in aggregate demand are 
inappropriate, (ii) nowadays, economies do 
not face large variability of macroeconomic 
aggregates and (in) plausible values of risk 
aversion coefﬁ cient entail a very small beneﬁ t 
in terms of global welfare from removing the 
remaining consumption variability.
On the contrary, Solow argued for a need 
to reinforce automatic stabilisa tion policies. 
According to him, reforms in allocation 
and repartition policies in the US and the 
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UK have also reduced the strength of 
automatic stabilisers: income taxes became 
less progressive, transfer spendings had 
been cut un der Reagan Administration 
and Thatcher governments. According to 
Solow, whatever the effects of such policies 
in terms of “allocation” or “repartition”, they 
have contributed to weaken the automatic 
stabilisers, and then have reduced the ability 
of the public sector to mitigate the harmful 
effects of macroeconomic disturbances.
The debate between on the one hand, 
supply-side reforms -under stability of 
monetary and spending aggregates as 
advocated by Lucas, and, on the other 
hand, tax-system reforms enhancing tax 
progressiveness and transfers as claimed 
by Solow, is a rather good illustration of the 
European discussions about national ﬁ scal 
policies and the Stability and Growth Pact.
After the launch of the Euro, Member-
States committed themselves to maintain 
their public deﬁ cit under 3% of GDP. As 
repeatedly pointed out by the European 
Commission (2002, 2003, inter alia), the 
global aim of this “Stability Pact” is to reach 
national public ﬁ nance surpluses “close 
to balance or in excess” in “the medium 
term”. The Stability Pact must preserve 
the tool of automatic stabilisers as far 
as public ﬁ nance ceilings are respected. 
Thus, the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (hereafter SGP) raises a 
twofold question for governments: How to 
seek permanently a bal anced position in 
the medium term? How to preserve and to 
promote the role of automatic stabilisers? 
Answers to these questions are quite 
qualiﬁ ed. In summary, it is widely recognized 
that the Stability Pact is too much strict: The 
structural balanced-budget objective looks 
contradictory with the need to enhance 
automatic stabilisers. Governments seem 
to give greater place to the former and 
miss rooms-to-manoeuvre for the later. 
Consequently many proposals to reform 
the Pact are discussed. We can distinguish 
reforms deal ing with the “numerical” rule of 
the Pact and reforms dealing with the need 
to build a new institutional framework for 
budgetary processes.
The outline of the paper is as follows. 
In the next section we report standard 
justiﬁ cations of ﬁ scal rules in EMU and we 
discuss the ability of the Pact to mitigate 
ﬁ scal externalities in terms of ﬁ nancial stability 
within the monetary union. Section 3 focuses 
on the macro stabilisation purpose of ﬁ scal 
policy. These two sections lead to a balanced 
appraisal, hence section 4 summarizes the 
main proposals of budgetary reforms in 
EMU. The last section concludes.
2. RATIONALES FOR FISCAL RULES
From its creation in 1997 in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Stability Pact has frequently 
been criticized. In the same time, arguments 
in favor of the Pact (or even in favor of a 
“modiﬁ ed” Pact) have changed. Initially, the 
SGP looked as a continuation of the famous 
Maastricht criteria which were said to select 
participants in the future Monetary Union. 
The main argument for deﬁ cit ceilings was 
the need for a ﬁ scal coordination in EMU, 
that could avoid the “lax” bias generated 
by a single supra-national monetary policy 
and free-riding governments. Another 
justiﬁ cation, becoming more important, relies 
on the need for monetary-ﬁ scal coordination 
in an non-inﬂ ationary union2.
2 A simple comparison between the statutes of 
the US Federal Reserve and those of the European 
Central Bank can show the greatest attention paid by 
European policy makers to inflation stability.
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2.1.  Excessive deficit bias in a 
monetary union
In the early 90’s, the Treaty of Maastricht 
introduced ceilings on public debt and deﬁ cit 
ratios as a way for removing free-riding 
behaviour from govern ments. This can be 
justiﬁ ed if the monetary union creates negative 
ﬁ scal spillovers, i.e. if an expansionary policy 
in one country could have recessive effects 
in other Member-States. In this national ﬁ scal 
expansion would be regarded as a negative 
shock by the remaining participants in the 
Union. Consequently, these latter would react 
by an expansionary policy. Never theless, it is 
still unclear whether negative ﬁ scal spillovers 
could dominate positive spillovers due to the 
standard external absorption.
Early justiﬁ cations of negative ﬁ scal 
spillovers in a monetary union deal with 
the dilution of the crowding-out effect. As 
a ﬁ scal expansion leads to an increase in 
the common interest rate, it can generate a 
negative effect on investment in every country 
of the monetary union that face the rise of the 
interest rate. According to Buiter, Corsetti and 
Roubini (1993) and Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(1998), the dilution of the crowding-out effect 
is based on the assumption of non-efﬁ cient 
bond markets, which receives few empirical 
support.
The monetary union can also create 
inappropriate incentives for governments to 
raise their deﬁ cits and debts that can make 
the European Central Bank under pressure 
for preserving ﬁ nancial stability. However, 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) claim 
that the ﬁ nancial structures and political 
institutions play a crucial role in order to 
prevent inﬂ ationary debt bailouts. Actually, 
the bailout risk deeply depends on the 
diffusion effect on bond market and on the 
bank exposure to national public debts.
Another argument in favor of negative 
spillovers is based on the intra EMU terms-
of-trade. Andersen and Sorensen (1995) and 
Jensen (1996) point out the negative effect 
of a domestic ﬁ scal expansion on other 
coun-tries’outputs. The domestic expansion 
increases demand in the whole union and 
leads to a rise in prices that reduces their 
competitiveness and the net effect can 
become negative in partner countries.
Without clear-cut response on the sign 
of the “net” spillover effect, the need for 
ﬁ scal coordination becomes questionable. 
This observation is the starting point of 
Beetsma, Debrun and Klaassen (2001). In 
a standard Key-nesian framework, where 
domestic demand is positively linked to 
foreign output, the sign of the “net” spillover 
effect depends on the combination of both 
ﬁ scal and monetary reactions with respect to 
different shocks (sup ply/demand; symmetric/
asymmetric). The model allows the authors 
to anal yse various kinds of coordination (by 
“ex ante” rule or by “ex post” discre tion) 
between ﬁ scal and monetary authorities. This 
model exhibits cases of counter-productive 
coordination due to free-riding behaviour 
and/or con ﬂ icts on the orientation of the 
policy mix. In particular, the risk of counter-
productive coordination becomes higher 
when Member State’s economies are hit by 
highly correlated shocks.
2.2.  Beyond the monetary union: fiscal 
sustainability and inflation stability
Despite the lack of consensus about the 
required coordination mechanism between 
ﬁ scal policies in a monetary union, there is 
a widespread agreement about the need to 
adopt a ﬁ scal rule in Europe. Furthermore, 
ﬁ scal rules are implemented in many countries 
that do not participate in a monetary union. 
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It is the case in the US, the UK and also 
in Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Canada, 
Switzerland among others. The institutional 
arrangement differs from one country to the 
other, but the general principle of the ﬁ scal 
rule as deﬁ ned by Kopits and Symanski 
(1998) is “a permanent constraint on ﬁ scal 
policy, expressed in terms of a summary 
indicator of ﬁ scal performance, such as the 
government budget deﬁ cit, borrowing, debt 
or a major component thereof”. In addition, 
according to Kopits and Symanski (1998), 
ﬁ scal rules have to satisfy some criteria: they 
should be well-deﬁ ned -a correct summary 
indicator is chosen; they should be based 
on transparency in government operation 
-in order to gain popular support; they 
should also be simple and ﬂ exible, i.e. able 
to mitigate exogenous shocks; ﬁ scal rule 
should be adequate and enforceable.
The ﬁ scal rule creates an institutional 
constraint for governments that have to 
adopt sustainable ﬁ scal policy. Stabilisation 
policies are then ex pected to let debt burden 
unchanged over a business cycle movement. 
Deﬁ cits increase during downturns, but have 
to decrease during following upturns. It is 
worth noting that ﬁ scal rules do not prohibit 
cyclical public deﬁ cits, thus they can be seen 
in line with both Keynesian and Neo-Ricardian 
theories. The institutional constraint is helpful 
to mitigate the bad incentives of gov ernment 
to postpone debt consolidation, mainly due 
to political reasons3.
Actually budgetary criteria, introduced 
in the Treaty of Maastricht seem to have 
signiﬁ cantly modiﬁ ed the behaviour of 
governments. According to Ballabriga and 
Martinez Mongay (2003, 2005) budget 
3 Starting points of the huge literature dealing with 
the political economy of debt consolidation are Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) and Alesina and Drazen (1991).
surpluses tend to react more strongly to 
accumulated debt in a stabilising way. 
Many cross-country differences in the debt 
consolidation have been pointed out. In 
Belgium and Italy the slow reduction of 
debt starts in the early 90s and lasts all the 
decade long. In Ireland, the consolidation 
happens earlier in the mid 80s, it is massive 
and brief. On the contrary France, Germany 
and Sweden begin to reduce their debt 
in the mid 90s. Fatás and Mihov (2002) 
document other interesting facts. The 
composition of the debt consolidation differs 
from one country to another. Globally the 
consolidation was based on revenue-rise 
policy in countries where public receipts 
were initially low (e.g. Italy and Spain). Other 
countries rely on spending-cuts based policy 
(e.g. Belgium, The Netherlands, Sweden). 
France and Germany, which have hardly any 
re duced their public expenditures, are still 
facing increase in their debt burden4.
European Treaties of Maastricht and 
Amsterdam may have (opportunely) helped 
countries to limit their debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Even if public debt is still above 60% of GDP, 
its accumulation does not look explosive 
anymore. Besides ensuring government 
solvency, a growing literature highlights a 
new positive effect of sound public ﬁ nances: 
make inﬂ ation stability easier.
In countries that have adopted ﬁ scal rule, 
the independent Central Bank is in charge 
of the implementation of the monetary policy 
and is accountable for inﬂ ation stability. A 
growing literature emphasizes the need 
for an anti-inﬂ ationary monetary policy to 
4 Composition effects in consolidation policy are 
well documented in literature, see inter alia Alesina 
and Perotti (1995), von Hagen et al. (2002). Empirical 
evidence of European convergence towards more 
disciplined fiscal policies are provided in De Bandt and 
Mongelli (2000).
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be complemented by a disciplined ﬁ scal 
pol icy. The seminal paper of Sargent and 
Wallace (1981) and later contributions by 
Leeper (1991) and especially Woodford 
(1995, 1998, 2001) have proposed a new 
interpretation of the inter-temporal budget 
constraint of the govern ment, which is the 
basis of “The Fiscal Theory of Price Level” 
(FTPL)5. The inter-temporal budget equation 
states the real amount of public debt 
equals the real discounted value of future 
government receipts net of expenditures 
(i.e. public budget surplus). Traditionally, 
this equation is regarded as a constraint: 
an increase in nominal debt is supposed to 
be compensated by an increase in future 
receipts (e.g. tax revenue) and/or a decrease 
in future public expenditures. On the contrary, 
advocates of the FTPL argue that changes 
of the price level can remove any nominal 
unbalances between pub lic debt and future 
budget surpluses. The main assumptions of 
the FTPL are, ﬁ rst, monetary policy cannot 
perfectly control inﬂ ation stability, it can not 
fully compensate the inﬂ ationary effect of 
ﬁ scal shocks6. Second, a key assumption 
is the possibility of government to neglect 
the development of the public debt when 
it deﬁ nes current ﬁ scal stances. There is a 
possibility for the public deﬁ cit not to react 
to the past debt burden. This behaviour is 
called “dominating” (by Sargent), “active” (by 
Leeper) and “non Ricardian” (by Woodford) 
ﬁ scal policy. According to the FTPL, this 
assumption does not lead to an explosive 
5 Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) provide a 
synthetic presentation of this theory and its related 
controversies.
6 Different channels explain the impact of fiscal 
shocks on inflation. Fiscal expansionary shock rises 
inflation as any demand component. Moreover, 
Woodford (1998) describes the rise in prices as the 
outcome of a wealth effect: an expected fall in tax 
leads to an increase in private consumption which 
increases prices in the long run.
growth of the real debt as prices will increase 
in order to satisfy the inter-temporal budget 
equation.
The ﬁ scal theory of price level faces 
numerous objections, in particular as far as 
its logically coherence, and over-identiﬁ cation 
issues. Buiter (2002) is, among others, 
one of the stronger opponent to the FTPL. 
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) provides a 
model in which the FTPL assumptions are still 
coherent with the remaining macroeconomic 
relations described in the model. They show 
that, under a non-Ricardian ﬁ scal policy, the 
central bank can control the average rate of 
inﬂ ation, but it cannot determine the variance 
of inﬂ ation because it cannot remove the 
impact of ﬁ scal shocks on the price level. 
A ﬁ scal rule, as a strong commitment of 
government to set a sound ﬁ scal policy 
(i.e. with a corrective reaction to the public 
debt development, ensuring the budget 
constraint is respected without pressure 
on prices) can help the monetary policy 
(deﬁ ned as by a Taylor-type interest rate rule) 
to achieve a low inﬂ ation rate with a lower 
variability. Ending with theoretical aspects, it 
is worth noting that a low level of inﬂ ation 
is widely regarded as source of economic 
efﬁ ciency, but there is less consensus about 
the welfare gains provided by low inﬂ ation 
variability.
The widespread emergence of ﬁ scal 
rule in numerous countries show that such 
agreement is not due to whatever external 
effects of national ﬁ scal poli cies in a monetary 
union. These rules are mainly devoted to 
contribute to both inﬂ ation stability and 
public ﬁ nance sustainability. Besides these 
two central objectives, ﬁ scal rules are also 
supposed to stabilise cyclical devel opment 
of economic activity. Under the limit of 3% 
of GDP, variations of the public deﬁ cit are 
regarded as an effective tool for smoothing 
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asymmetric shocks in EMU, while the single 
monetary policy reacts to area-wide price 
developments. In the following section, we 
document some empirical results dealing 
with ﬁ scal policy rooms-to-manoeuvre within 
a ﬁ scal rule.
3.  FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY
Fiscal policy devoted to aggregate demand 
management had been questioned by 
both academics and policy makers in the 
80’s. Stylised facts highlight that the growth 
of both public deﬁ cits and debts did not 
prevent European-wide economic growth 
and employment from falling. Nevertheless, 
increases in deﬁ cits during downturns is still 
considered as welfare improving, even in the 
neo-Ricardian model of tax-smoothing by 
Barro (1989). According to him distorsive taxes 
constitute the main objection to the Ricardian 
equivalence: frequent shifts in taxes in order to 
balance changes in public expenditures can 
generate distortionary effects and important 
welfare loss. Instead of im plementing balanced 
ﬁ scal stances, governments must adjust tax 
rates to the only permanent changes in public 
spendings. Empirical studies in Europe do 
not conclude that governments have such a 
rational behaviour7. Fiscal rules do not prohibit 
cyclical adjustment of ﬁ scal components. 
Counter-cyclical reactions of government 
revenues and transfers are expected to 
mitigate ex ogenous shocks.
3.1. Discretionary Fiscal Policy
The development of large dataset 
collecting ﬁ scal variables at semi-annual and 
7 Tax-smoothing is supported on US an UK data. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, debt adjustments 
are frequently delayed for political reasons.
quarterly frequencies has recently lead to 
numerous empirical studies addressing the 
real macroeconomic effects of ﬁ scal policy. 
So far, ﬁ scal mul tipliers were computed 
thanks to large macroeconomic models 
as QUEST and INTERLINK. New empirical 
developments provide several advantages: 
em pirical results are more easily replicable, 
they also allow for more comparison tests 
and robustness checks. A leading academic 
contribution is Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002), which exposes an original approach 
for identifying ﬁ s cal shocks in Structural 
Vector Autoregressive (S-VAR)8. Marcellino 
(2006) adapts this approach for a larger 
set of variables and computes estimates 
of S-VARs. He then simulates the impulse 
responses to shocks in four European 
countries.
S-VAR methodology is a powerful 
tool to investigate the empirical effects 
of economic policy as it requires few 
theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, 
interpretation of the results must be done 
carefully. A particular attention must be paid 
to the meanings of the “structural policy 
shocks”. Statistically, they correspond to 
the unexpected changes of endogenous 
variables (among wich a ﬁ scal policy indicator 
is included). This unexpected component 
is usu ally regarded as an indicator of non-
systematic or discretionary ﬁ scal policy. It 
thus corresponds to a change in ﬁ scal policy 
which is not related to any par ticular cyclical 
situation. Marcellino (2006) shows these 
ﬁ scal policy shocks have few signiﬁ cant 
effects on output gaps and inﬂ ation rates. 
This general result is still veriﬁ ed with different 
components of government budgets 
8 Perotti (2002) provides an interesting extension 
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). He also discusses 
the different methods available in the literature for the 
identification of fiscal shocks.
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(consumption, transfers, investment, direct 
taxes on households, business direct taxes 
and indirect taxes). The general conclusion 
one can draw from these analysis concerning 
the usefulness of discretionary policy is far 
from positive. Fiscal shocks do not provide 
any macroeconomic stabilisation, indeed, 
they contribute to raise public deﬁ cits and 
threaten public ﬁ nance sustainability.
Other interesting results are provided by 
Fatás and Mihov (2003). This paper is based 
on cross-country and panel estimates of 
the relationship be tween the volatility of 
discretionary ﬁ scal policy and the volatility of 
eco nomic growth9. Fatás and Mihov (2003) 
show that a higher volatility of discretionary 
policy leads to a higher output volatility. In 
addition, ﬁ scal discretion is also costly in 
terms of economic growth. A 1% increase 
in out put volatility generated by a 1.2% 
increase in ﬁ scal discretion reduces the 
trend of growth of about 0.8%.
3.2. Fiscal automatic stabilisers
Considering the criticisms raised by ﬁ scal 
activism, ﬁ scal rules rely on the working of 
automatic stabilisers. The latter are expected 
to provide several advantages: at ﬁ rst sight 
no political decision is needed to trigger off 
counter cyclical development of government 
deﬁ cits. In turn, no lobbying pressure, nor 
institutional control, neither administrative 
implementation are required, furthermore, 
working “automatically” stabilisers operate 
without delay with respect to the bad 
9 Using panel data, authors extract a public deficit 
adjusted from automatic and dis cretionary reaction to 
business cycle and then compute the variance of the 
residuals they interpret as the size or the aggressiveness 
of discretionary changes. In a last step, they estimate a 
linear regression of economic growth variance on the 
variance of fiscal policy residuals.
disturbances they are expected to mitigate. 
Automatic stabilisers work thanks to the 
cyclical dependence of various bud get 
components. Unemployment subsidies and 
other transfers rise during downturns and 
decrease during upturns. More important, 
ﬁ scal revenues coming from direct and 
indirect taxes are deeply pro-cyclical. The 
measure of the elasticity of public deﬁ cit 
with respect to output-gaps raises some 
methodological issues10. Early OECD studies 
derive a ﬁ scal elas ticity to cycle of about 
0.5: when economic growth declines by 
1%, public deﬁ cit rises of 0.5%. Subsequent 
estimations by Wyplosz (1999) and Mélitz 
(2000) ﬁ nd a smaller elasticity of about 
0.1-0.2. Two complementary ele ments can 
explain the fall in the elasticities during the 
90s: ﬁ rst the degree of automatic response 
has decreased consequently to other 
economic and po litical reforms, second 
automatic stabilisers remain as strong as in 
the past, but their action is overlooked by 
pro-cyclical discretionary policy -aiming at 
maintaining public deﬁ cits under the ratio of 
3% of GDP every year.
Without surprise the second explanation 
is well reported by various aca demic papers 
such as van den Noord (2000) and Wyplosz 
(2002)11. On av erage, European governments 
do not take advantage of good times for 
10 One particular issue is due to endogeneity of 
output gaps as budget balances are a component 
of aggregate demand. Moreover, another source 
of endogeneity is analysed by Mélitz (2005), when 
cyclically adjusted budget components and output 
gaps are expressed as ratios to potential output, they 
can be inefficiently estimated if potential output is not 
deterministic but subject to supply shocks.
11 One important exception is Gali and Perotti 
(2003), they show that active fiscal policies in EMU 
and OECD countries have become more counter-
cyclical in the post-Maastricht period. Authors, 
themselves, carefully remind that European countries 
had faced lesser real recessions in the 90s than in the 
past.
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reducing their structural deﬁ cit and then 
recovering rooms-to-manoeuvre in order 
to face following downturns. Consequently, 
governments must prevent their deﬁ cit from 
increasing above 3% and are compelled 
to rise taxes or to cut expenditures during 
bad times, while the contrary would be 
much more desirable. Besides reducing the 
degree of macroeconomic stabilisation, this 
ﬁ scal behaviour generates an accumulation 
of public debt that binds more and more 
the ability of governments to let automatic 
stabilisers work.
The competing explanation of the decline 
in cyclical sensitivity of public budget deals 
with tax and welfare policies implemented 
in order to increase economic efﬁ ciency but 
which may have cushioned gains provided 
by cycli cal stabilisation. Supply-side 
policies such as cuts in social transfers and 
reductions of taxes are usually expected to 
reduce some economic wastings due to bad 
incentives generated for suppliers. Removing 
such welfare losses, by increasing efﬁ ciency 
in output and input markets can increase 
economic growth. Tax-base grows up, even 
with a lower tax rate, it can provide a sufﬁ cient 
level of ﬁ scal revenues for ﬁ nancing regalian 
public expenditures. Nevertheless, this kind 
of policy can reduce automatic stabilisers 
and then it can increase macroeconomic 
volatility. Many empirical studies, from Gali 
(1994) to Fatás and Mihov (2001,a,b) have 
repeatedly highlighted that the degree of 
automatic stabilisation is correlated with 
the public sector size. Then, any reduction 
in public spendings could have negative 
effects on au tomatic stabilisers.
Nevertheless, Hairault, Langot and Portier 
(2001), Buti et al. (2002) and Wijkander 
and Roeger (2002) have shown that a 
reduction of the tax burden, even a less 
generous social security system can not 
always be contradictory with more effective 
macroeconomic stabilisation. These papers 
exhibit cases in which supply-side effects 
of automatic stabilisers are stronger than 
stan dard smoothing effects of demand 
disturbances. In Buti et al. (2002) there is 
a critical threshold value of the tax burden 
over which automatic stabilisers switch off, 
i.e. become destabilising. The threshold 
value mainly depends on the relative size of 
the economy and its degree of openness. 
In small open countries the tax burden 
threshold is smaller than in large countries: 
the tax burden quickly jeopardizes the 
working of automatic stabilisers12.
Table 1 displays results from simulations 
aiming at computing the degree of automatic 
stabilisation provided by tax codes and 
social security systems in EMU countries. In 
the ﬁ rst two columns we report simulation 
results re spectively based on the Interlink 
model of the OECD and the NiGEM model of 
the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research. The coefﬁ cient of automatic 
stabilisation is calculated by the root mean 
squared deviation between the volatility of 
OECD estimated output gaps from 1991 to 
2000, and the volatility of simulated output 
gaps in which the cyclical effects of public 
budget items are removed by discretionary 
policy.
NiGEM reports smaller coefﬁ cients, mainly 
because contrary to Interlink, it does not only 
focus on the smoothing effects of internal 
demand shocks13. On average, cyclical 
12 Automatic stabilisers smooth the effects of 
exogenous shocks by supporting aggregate demand. 
In small open countries these demand-side effects 
largely run over the domestic economy, but a high 
tax burden reduce market flexibility and adjustment to 
shocks.
13 More details on Interlink’s results can be found in 
van den Noord (2000) and NiGEM model is presented 
in Barrel and Pina (2000).
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reactions of public budget components 
smooth between 10% and 30% of economic 
volatility according to Interlink model, the range 
of the smoothing effect is about 5%-10% in 
NiGEM model.
Brunila et al. (2003) use the QUEST model 
for analysing the role of auto matic stabilisers 
with respect to various shocks, this 
disaggregated approach allows to analyse 
with more precision important cross-country 
differences observed in previous studies. In 
order to compute this estimation a 3-step 
method is used. First, authors compute the 
sensitivity of the budget com ponent with 
respect to different economic ﬂ uctuations. 
Then short-run ﬁ scal multipliers are 
calculated. Finally, the stabilisation impact of 
budget com ponents is given by the product 
of the cyclically change in public budget 
balance and short term ﬁ scal multipliers. 
In every country ﬁ scal automatic stabilisers 
have the strongest effect in smoothing 
private consumption shocks: about 30% 
of induced GDP ﬂ uctuations are removed. 
The impact is less than 20% in Belgium and 
Ireland.
In the case of investment shocks, the 
impact of ﬁ scal automatic stabilisers is 
smaller in every country. It is around 5% 
in smaller countries and close to 10% in 
larger economies: Germany, Spain, France 
and Italy. The same still applies as far as 
shocks on export demand are concerned. 
Automatic changes in public budget balance 
smooth more than 10% of GDP development 
gener ated by external shocks in the four 
bigger countries, while the impact differs 
more largely between smaller countries. 
Table 1
Degree of Automatic Stabilisers
Countries Interlink NiGEM
QUEST
Cons. Invest. Export Product.
Belgium 22 5 19 5 9 3
Germany 31 18 29 8 12 7
Greece 14 – 35 9 11 5
Spain 17 13 29 7 19 4
France 14 7 38 10 14 5
Ireland 10 7 14 3 5 1
Italy 23 5 30 10 14 11
The Netherlands 36 6 20 5 8 3
Austria 7 12 20 5 8 3
Portugal – 10 30 5 10 5
Finland 58 7 32 5 11 1
Notes: Results for Interlink and NiGEM come from European Commission (2001) quoted by Brunila et 
al. (2003). Figures for QUEST are extracted from graphs displayed in Brunila et al. (2003).
Cons, means consumption shock, Invest, investment shock, Export, export demandshock and 
Product, labour productivity shock.
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Actually the size of automatic sta biliser effect 
depends on the cyclical reaction of budget 
components -which is lower in countries 
that have adopted small direct tax rates, 
like Ireland. It also depends on the short-run 
ﬁ scal multipliers -that are lower in more open 
countries, typically in small open countries.
In the case of a negative supply shock 
that reduces potential output and increases 
prices, ﬁ scal automatic stabilisers are 
expected to be negligeable in order to 
reduce the anti-inﬂ ationary response of the 
central bank. More over if the supply shock 
is permanent, a ﬁ scal counter-shock on 
aggregate demand could let the economy 
postpone the adjustment of output to 
its new potential. Except in the case of 
Italy, QUEST model shows that automatic 
stabilisers are the weakest in response to 
labour productivity shocks. Larger countries 
still have the larger smoothing effect, which 
this time cannot be so desirable.
The empirical results show the superiority 
of automatic stabilisers upon ﬁ scal activism 
as a powerful tool to mitigate negative 
economic shocks. Nev ertheless, the Stability 
and Growth Pact is commonly regarded 
as too much strict. Some European 
governments have dampened the automatic 
stabilisers in order to respect the deﬁ cit 
ceiling involved in the Pact. The next section 
summarizes academic contributions to a 
new ﬁ scal rule for European governments 
that can remove these drawbacks.
4. REFORMING THE PACT
Issues raised by the implementation of a 
ﬁ scal rule in Europe deal with the need to 
recover budgetary rooms-to-manoeuvre 
(in order to let automatic sta bilisers fully 
work) without jeopardizing public ﬁ nances 
sustainability. Two kinds of proposals can be 
distinguished: a change in the “numerical” 
rule or a modiﬁ cation of European and/or 
national institutions.
4.1. Alternative numerical rules
According to Kopits and Symansky 
(1998), the design of a good ﬁ scal rule 
deeply depends on the “summary indicator 
of the ﬁ scal performance” that is chosen as a 
target. The SGP constraints the total public 
budget balance. One can see such a target 
as “simple”, moreover as it includes the net 
interest payments, this target takes care of 
the debt burden and can preserve public 
ﬁ nances sustainability. However, the ceiling 
of public deﬁ cit to GDP ratio may overlook 
the cyclical development of public budget.
Many economists claim that a ﬁ scal rule 
should take the cyclically-adjusted deﬁ cit 
as the constrained variable. In turn, the 
European Com mission recognizes the Pact 
is based on a close-to-balance position in 
the medium-run i.e. a rule of 0% of structural 
deﬁ cit over the cycle. Never theless such a 
rule may be difﬁ cult to implement, ﬁ rst it 
requires a correct measure of the cyclically-
adjusted balances as well as a relevant 
reference for the time-period used to 
characterize the cycle and to appreciate the 
efforts governments would make to reach 
the target.
Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) have 
proposed to overlook these measurement 
issues by introducing a rule of public 
expenditures. One interesting feature is that 
this component is not so much dependent 
on the cycle. This rule states the public 
expenditures at year t would have to equal 
the total receipts induced by the potential 
output of year t. Buiter and Grafe (2003) 
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have proposed a Permanent Budget Rule 
based on the tax-smoothing principle. 
The permanent budget deﬁ cit would be 
computed as the difference between 
the long run average of future values of 
public expenditures and tax receipts, this 
permanent deﬁ cit would be constrained to 
equal zero.
Both contributions can be realistic, and 
more economically meaningful, but none 
of them justiﬁ es the arbitrary choice of 0% 
structural deﬁ cit as a target. The point is 
highlighted by economists who worry that a 
too much strict ﬁ scal rule leads to a recessive 
bias. When a government is compelled 
to some spending-cuts, it would prefer to 
reduce spendings like public in vestments 
that do not matter politically. Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2004) claim public investments 
can efﬁ ciently be ﬁ nanced by borrowing 
inasmuch as they would mainly beneﬁ t to 
future generations of taxpayers. Conversely, 
funding public investments by current 
receipts could increase distortionary effects 
induced by tax variability. Consequently a 
tight budget constraint would jeopardize 
governement’s incentives to undertake 
some investments.
The positive effect of public investment 
on potential growth constitutes the main 
motivation for replacing the current SGP by 
some golden rule i.e. a constraint holding 
on the net-of-investment structural balance 
(Modigliani et al.,1998). This proposition in 
not consensual. First there are some sta-
tistical (and political) issues for correctly 
distinguish public investment and public 
operating expenditures, second there is no 
clear-cut answer whether the rule might 
exclude gross public investment or net 
public investment, the former can threaten 
the reduction of debts and deﬁ cits while 
the latter turns to very little difference with 
the actual SGP inasmuch as net-public 
invest ment amounts to only 1% of GDP on 
average over a cycle14.
Calmfors and Corsetti (2002) have 
proposed to take into account the debt 
burden. The deﬁ cit ceiling would be higher 
in more indebted countries. This proposition 
has the advantage of providing country 
distinction and gives priority to debt 
reduction only when the debt burden is still 
important. Fiscal policy can recover more 
ﬂ exibility when government solvency is far 
form threatening EMU’s ﬁ nancial stability.
4.2. No rules but institutions
Other proposals deal with substantial 
changes in European and national ﬁ s cal 
institutions. Rationales for such reforms are 
twofold. First it is widely recognized that the 
actual SGP is not as credible as it could be. 
The ex cessive deﬁ cit procedure for instance is 
submitted to a vote of the European Council 
(acting by a qualiﬁ ed majority). France did not 
follow European recommendations in 2002 
and did not present a balanced budgetary 
position neither in 2004, nor in 2006. Second 
a ﬁ scal rule can be an inappropriate way for 
coordinating policies in EMU as pointed out 
by Beetsma, Debrun and Klaassen (2001). 
It is frequently recognized that ﬁ scal policy 
should remain decided at national level, an 
every proposition to built a federal ﬁ scal policy 
never goes out from academic debate15.
Wyplosz (2002) has proposed to 
create in every Member-State, a Fiscal 
14 Mathieu and Sterdyniak (2003)
15 A Union-wide budget would create automatic 
transfers from countries meeting good cyclical 
positions to countries facing downturns Inter alia: 
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) and Bayoumi and 
Masson (1995).
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Policy Committee: independent vis-á-vis 
governments and accountable to the 
Parliament. The Committee would set the 
budget balance in line with sustainability 
constraint, while tax and expenditure policies 
would remain the responsability of the 
government. For instance, the Committee 
could compel the government to reduce the 
debt burden over a given time period or to 
balanced budget position over the cycle. This 
proposition relies on inde pendent institution 
to overlook political short-run considerations 
in deﬁ ning ﬁ scal stances.
We have already mentioned that most 
of issues raised by the Pact come from its 
asymmetric aspects: while binding excessive 
deﬁ cits even in down turns, it provides no 
incentives to reduce deﬁ cits during upturns. 
Cassela (2001) claims for the creation of 
tradable deﬁ cit permits. Once deﬁ ning an 
aggregate amount of deﬁ cit for the Union as 
a whole and an initial distri bution of deﬁ cit 
permits, governments could deviate from the 
initial allowed deﬁ cit by buying permits from 
other countries in surplus. The mechanism 
looks well designed to mitigate asymmetric 
shocks but it assumes that na tional deﬁ cits 
are perfect substitutes (and then, generate 
the same external ities). Moreover, such a 
market can be efﬁ cient (i.e. do not entail 
rents nor wastings) only if it is competitive: 
there are many suppliers of surpluses and 
many demanders of additional deﬁ cits.
Relying on market mechanism or on 
national committees to remove some 
drawbacks of the SGP can look appealing 
but these proposals can also be regarded 
as far from giving European policies more 
democratic objectives and control. Fitoussi 
and Saraceno (2002) show that the 
importance given to sound public ﬁ nance 
or inﬂ ation stability at the European level 
leads na tional governments to satisfy these 
“intermediate objectives” before or even 
instead of national actions claimed by voters 
such as better employment poli cies or higher 
standards-of-living. According to these 
authors, shortcomings of the European 
governance and of its economic priorities 
play an important role in the slowing down 
of European potential growth.
Pisani-Ferry (2004) has proposed the 
Eurozone Council to become a much more 
important decision-making institution, capable 
to deﬁ ne and to im plement consensual and 
even discretionary policies among national 
policy makers. Such propositions aim at 
introducing discretionary coordination in 
EMU’s macroeconomic policy. Coeuré and 
Pisani-Ferry (2005) have exposed a detailed 
Sustainability and Growth Pact that combines 
both an alter native numerical rule and a new 
governance process. This new pact would 
be based on national balance sheets that 
take into account the net present value of 
Age-Related Net Implicit Liabilities (ARNIL) 
in order to measure net fu ture commitments 
of general government due to demographic 
change (e.g. more pension payments and less 
education spending) at different horizons of 
time. A ﬁ ve-year target value for the net public 
deﬁ cit would be computed as an average 
of the net present value of all other future 
expenditures and a percentage of ARNIL. This 
more sophisticated approach aims at taking 
into account important national disparities as 
far as -potential growth, aging pop ulation, 
and incentives to implement reforms are 
concerned. It would allow more discretion in 
national policies, but each year governments 
would have to published: a ﬁ scal plan (rather 
close to actual stability programmes) a reform 
plan and a contingency plan. Those plans 
would have to be discussed by the European 
Council of Finance Ministers (Ecoﬁ n) and 
then would have to be adopted by national 
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parliaments. This proposal deeply highlights 
the need for the European Union to adopt a 
better governance.
5. CONCLUSION
National governments in EMU are 
constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact 
to maintain their public deﬁ cits under 3% of 
GDP. Academics and even policy makers have 
constantly questioned this deﬁ cit ceiling as its 
positive outcomes in terms of inﬂ ation stability 
and public ﬁ nance sustainability are often seen 
as contradictory with the usual role of ﬁ scal 
policy: smoothing real activity variations in case 
of asymmetric exogenous shocks. Actually, a 
ﬁ scal rule like the Stability Pact mainly relies 
on ﬁ scal automatic stabilisers to mitigate 
such shocks. European governments have to 
reach budgetary positions “close to balance 
or in surplus” in the “medium term” and to let 
cyclical changes in budget components thwart 
macroeconomic disturbances. Wondering if 
such a rule work, economic studies provide a 
balanced response:
• Numerous empirical results have pointed 
out the harmful and desta bilising effects 
of fiscal activism, and thus have given 
support to some institutional arrange-
ments to bind governments hands.
• Globally, public debt and deficit ceilings 
have entailed a change in Euro pean 
fiscal policies that have become more 
disciplined and sustainable.
• Budget balances sensitivity to cycle 
have declined in the 90s, automatic 
stabilisers may have been dampened 
by discretionary actions aiming at 
reducing the debt burden or limiting the 
deficit during downturns.
• Besides the difficult implementation 
of the rule induced by the pro-cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal authorities, the 
effectiveness of automatic stabilisers 
is quite different from a country to 
another. The case of small-open 
countries particularly matters..
Consequently, many economists who 
claim for reforming the Pact have proposed 
alternative ﬁ scal rules or new institutional 
arrangements that can enhance the ability 
of European ﬁ scal policies to smooth 
macroeconomic shocks. Some proposals 
claim for a change in the target variable of 
the Pact, others advocate that the need 
for more coordination, more discretion and 
more democratic legitimacy in deﬁ ning 
macroeconomic policies requires a new 
institutional framework at both national and 
European levels.
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